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Outsourcing of Legal Work: Tonic or Trojan Horse? 
Introduction 
 Outsourcing, the practice of one company hiring another company to perform and 
manage a business process,1 is not a new business concept.2 Neither is the practice of 
outsourcing to companies in other countries, or “offshoring.”3 Moving certain business functions 
offshore for strategic and financial gain is in fact so prevalent in American business today that it 
has become a hot issue for election year debate.4 Typically seen in operational positions of 
manufacturing industries, advances in technology have made outsourcing a real possibility for 
many other types of industries and is affecting professional positions.5 It is common knowledge 
that the software industry has begun to use outsourcing on a regular basis. Other businesses, such 
as credit card processing centers, have relied on outsourcing for many years, and the magnitude 
of such outsourcing has greatly increased in recent years.  
 The legal profession is not immune to this practice as law firms are businesses affected 
by changes in the economy and seek to be competitive like every other business. Law firms have 
long ago turned to outsourcing as the solution to cost cutting of non-legal support services.6 
Today, a few firms are successfully experimenting with offshoring of legal work including 
research, brief writing, patent work and Employee Retirement Income Security Act work.7 The 
                                                 
1 Economic Policy Institute, Offshoring Frequently asked Questions (June 2004) at 
http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/issueguide_offshoring_faq [hearinafter Offshoring FAQ]. 
2 Daniel W. Drezner, The Outsourcing Bogeyman, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May/June 2004 available at 
http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/20040501faessay83304/daniel-w-drezner/the-outsourcing-bogeyman.html. 
3 Offshoring FAQ, supra note 1. 
4 Christine Hines, Fending Off Political Attacks On Offshoring, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at 3. 
5 Drezner, supra note 2. 
6 Anthony Lin, India Too Far? Call Fargo, LEGAL TIMES Aug. 9, 2004, at 12 [hearinafter Lin, Fargo]. 
7 Geanne Rosenberg, Offshore Legal Work Continues To Make Gains Ethics And Malpractice Are Among The Key 
Issues That May Arise In Outsourcing, NAT’L L. J. May 17, 2004, at S3 (col.1). 
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question then becomes how far law firms can advance this trend, in the domestic and 
international arenas, given the legal profession’s ethical constraints. 
 In examining the question of the ethical constraints on the outsourcing and offshoring of 
legal work, this paper contends: outsourcing of core legal services is likely in conflict with 
current ethical standards regarding client confidentiality, responsible supervision and restrictions 
on multi-jurisdictional practices. Changing these standards to take advantage of current 
technological capabilities and the correlated cost savings would detrimentally alter the legal 
profession, creating multiple classes of lawyers and the perception of legal services as a price-
driven commodity. 
Professionalism 
 The practice of law is referred to as a profession; attorneys as professionals. Such a 
reference begs the question as to what exactly those terms embody. In 1953, Roscoe Pound 
defined “profession” as the pursuit of a learned art with the primary purpose of public service 
and the ability to earn a living being incidental.8 The A.B.A. in the preamble to its Model Rules 
for Professional Conduct embraces the spirit of this definition, that the profession of law is more 
about others than about one’s self: “As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should 
cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of 
the law and work to strengthen legal education.”9 Furthermore, lawyers are charged “to 
exemplify the legal profession’s ideals of public service.”10 Even in making the rules which 
govern the profession the preamble reiterates this theme: “The profession has a responsibility to 
                                                 
8 STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 11-12 (Aspen Publishers 6th ed. 
2002) (2001) [hearinafter GILLERS, REGULATION]. 
9 MODEL RULE FOR PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2003). 
10 Id. 
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assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial 
or self-interested concerns of the bar.”11 
 All of this extolling of virtues and responsibilities could be easily dismissed as 
propaganda or wishful thinking except that the depth of the profession’s commitment to such 
ideals is reflected within the Rules themselves.12 Well known are the admonitions about keeping 
client confidences13 or that conflicts of interest in its various forms must be avoided.14 Lesser 
known is that confidences are to be kept for former clients15 as well as for consultations with 
potential clients regardless of whether or not they ever become actual clients.16 The Rules go so 
far as to set forth the fee an attorney may charge and the acceptable basis for the fee.17 
 Outside the Rules, the merits and the bounds of professionalism are debated constantly. 
One particular area where this occurs is in regard to an attorney’s ability to advertise his/her 
practice, despite the Supreme Court’s recognition that an attorney has a First Amendment18 right 
to some limited commercial speech.19 Cautions abound that the attorney should exercise that 
                                                 
11 Id. 
12 This is only one view. Many practitioners would argue that the Model Rules actually serve to protect the interests 
of the attorneys rather than those of the client. For example, consider Model Rule 5.5 which prohibits the 
unauthorized practice of law. Touted as protective of clients from the incompetent or unscrupulous, those skeptical 
of the value of this Model Rule would argue that the prohibition essentially forms a localized cartel. The rule 
prevents lower-cost competition from non-lawyers and acts as a barrier to interstate competition from lawyers 
licensed in other states. (See Ronald D. Rotunda, Legal Ethics – The Lawyer’s Deskbook On Professional 
Responsibility § 39-2 (2002-2003 ed. 2002)). 
13 MODEL RULE FOR PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003). 
14 MODEL RULE FOR PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7-1.11 (2003). 
15 MODEL RULE FOR PROF’L  CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2003). 
16 MODEL RULE FOR PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18 (2003). 
17 MODEL RULE FOR PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2003). 
18 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
19 See generally Bates v State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (advertising by lawyers is commercial speech 
entitled to First Amendment protection); Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (in-person solicitation 
by lawyer is not protected by the First Amendment); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 6262 
(1985) (targeted advertisements permissible); and Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) 
(targeted mailings permissible). 
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right tastefully and with dignity20 lest the attorney forget that the practice of law is a profession 
and not a “trade or occupation like any other.”21 
 The reasons for these cautions were well articulated by Justice O’Connor in her dissent 
for Shapero.22 As members of a learned profession, attorneys have ethical obligations to observe 
certain standards of conduct and to serve the public.23 Such membership also means they have 
specialized knowledge not easily gained by the public.24 With this knowledge comes power; 
power which if abused undermines the integrity and the efficiency of the judicial system; power 
which places the client-consumer at a disadvantage and makes it unrealistic to expect that the 
client-consumer can strike a fair bargain for representation; for access to the legal system.25 
“[M]arket forces and the ordinary legal prohibition against force and fraud [being] insufficient to 
protect the consumers,” an attorney’s ethical obligations then, are “properly understood as an 
appropriate means of restraining lawyers in the exercise of the unique power that they inevitably 
wield in a [] system like ours.”26 
Economic Reality 
 While these arguments for professionalism come from a debate over attorney advertising, 
the basic need that necessitated the debate is pure economic survival. Attorneys need to attract 
clients somehow, or integrity intact; they will remain professionals, yet forfeit their livelihood. 
Advertising, however, is just one part of the larger economic whole; of the reality that the 
                                                 
20 GILLERS, REGULATION, supra note 8, at 1022 (citing 4 LAWYERS MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 96 (Mar. 
30, 1988)) (A.B.A. Commission on Professionalism proposed “aspirational goals” for legal ads). 
21 Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 486 U.S. 466, 490 (1988) (O’Connor J. dissenting). 
22 Id.at 480-91. 
23 Id.at 488-89. 
24 Id. at 489. 
25 Id. at 489-90. 
26 Id. 
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practice of law is a business endeavor. A reality the A.B.A. concedes creates the lion’s share of 
ethical conflicts.27 
 General economy 
 Since economics is so influential to the profession, it is important to understand the 
factors and circumstances that are currently wielding the most influence and those that are likely 
to shape the future. These factors and circumstances are found within both the general economy 
of the country and within the microeconomic climate of the legal industry.  
  Unemployment 
 The United States’ economy has struggled since the last official recession began in 
March 2001. As part of that struggle the nation has been combating one of its highest 
unemployment insurance exhaustion rates.28 The economy is still feeling the effects of this fact 
since many of these same people have stopped seeking work and are therefore no longer counted 
among the statistically unemployed.29 The result is an artificially suppressed unemployment 
rate.30 Consequently, while statistically the United States appears to be approaching a full 
employment level, the reality is not quite as encouraging.31 
 
 
                                                 
27 MODEL RULE FOR PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2003). 
28 Lee Price & Sujan Vasavada, Annual unemployment insurance exhaustion rate at highest level in 60 years, 
ECONOMIC SNAPSHOTS, Sept. 22, 2004, (Unemployment insurance benefits are for a fixed term and amount. When 
these limits are reached, the person is said to have exhausted their benefits.), at 
http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/webfeatures_snapshots_09222004. 
29 Lee Price & Yulia Fungard, Understanding The Severity Of The Current Labor Slump, ECONOMIC POLICY 
INSTITUTE BRIEFING PAPER, updated Feb. 19, 2004, original Nov. 2003, at 
http://www.epinet.org/briefingpapers/146/epi_bp146.pdf. 
30 Jared Bernstein & Yulia Fungard, Employment growing, but labor slack remains, JOBS PICTURE, Feb. 4, 2005, at 
http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/webfeatures_econindicators_jobspict_20050204; Price & Fungard, supra note 29 
(last estimate places true unemployment rate 1.5% higher). 
31 Bernstein & Fungard, supra note 30 (current unemployment rate is 5.2%); Mark Gongloff, How bad is the jobless 
rate? Historically speaking, unemployment could be a lot worse, but it should be an awful lot better, CNNMONEY, 
June 19, 2003, (full employment is anywhere between 5.0% and 5.5%), at 
http://money.cnn.com/2003/06/19/news/economy/jobless_rate/. 
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  Job losses 
 Coupled with the unemployment rate is the actual number of jobs lost from the economy 
as a result of the recession and the extent to which those jobs will be recovered. Initially what 
was a “jobless recovery” is no longer considered “jobless” overall.32 However, it took an 
unprecedented 46 months for the labor market to regain the jobs it lost in the last recession 
versus an average of only 21 months.33 This statistic counts simply the total number of jobs in 
the economy. To see the true impact of the recession and where the recovery actually has 
occurred, a more segmented look is needed. For example, looking at private versus government, 
private sector jobs remain 703,000 below their pre-recession level.34 Going further and dividing 
the private sector into industries, the numbers show an increase in services, but a continuing 
decline in manufacturing jobs.35 
 Some dismiss these gains and losses in various sectors as a natural restructuring of the 
economy.36 Outside the economic model, however, are industries and people who must cope 
with the resulting changes. To remain in business, to retain what jobs they can, many will look to 
outsourcing as the solution. One forecast of national outsourcing trends places the number of 
jobs to be lost over the next fifteen years at 3.3 million.37 
 Basic Economics of the Legal Profession 
 In just a ten-year span between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, the changes in the 
balance of costs and revenues within law firms were significant. According to the Altman Weil 
Pensa Survey of Law Firm Economics, “[P]er-lawyer overhead in U.S. law firms has increased 
                                                 
32 Jared Bernstein, 2004: Jobless recovery begets wageless recovery, ECONOMIC SNAPSHOTS, Jan. 19, 2005, at 
http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/webfeatures_snapshots_20050119. 
33 Bernstein & Fungard, supra note 30. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Drezner, supra note 2. 
37 Drezner, supra note 2. 
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more than 81 percent, while per-lawyer revenues have increased only 73 percent. Likewise, price 
competition has limited the increase of billing rates at 55 percent, and billable hours recorded by 
partners increased by six percent.”38 
  Demographics: More Lawyers Equals More Competition 
 Adding to the economic pressures and competition is the sheer number of lawyers 
practicing today. The past several decades have seen the percentage of lawyers, as a percentage 
of the American population, increase significantly.39 In the mid 1980s, the ratio was 1 lawyer for 
every 360 persons.40 By the mid 1990s, the ratio had dropped to 1 lawyer for every 290 
persons.41 
  Technology 
 Technology has changed the way in which legal work is done: increasing the speed, 
accuracy, and volume of work that can be produced. Internet access is now a required investment 
for any business, as it has become an indispensable multifunctional tool.42 It provides numerous 
sources for research, e-mail and fax communications with clients, forums for dispute resolutions, 
even electronic filing of court documents.43 Telecommuting, electronic storage of documents, 
and on-line legal resources, at minimum, all translate to reduced overhead for law firms in the 
form of a reduced need for physical space.44 
                                                 
38 Ward Bower, Law Office Management: Economic Trends In The Legal Profession: Planning Implications For 
Law Firms, 32 ARIZ. ATT’Y 16, 17 (May 1996). 
39 Feature: Working Notes: Deliberations of the ABA Committee on Research about the Future of the Legal 
Profession on the Current Status of the Legal Profession, 17 MAINE BAR J. 48, 53 (2002) [hearinafter Feature]. 
40 Bower, supra note 38.  
41 Bower, supra note 38. 
42 See Michael R. Arkfeld, Front: Technology & Law: Trends In Legal Technology – Advantages And Challenges, 
37 AZ ATTORNEY 12 (January 2001). 
43 Feature, supra note 39, at 51-52. 
44 Bower, supra note 38, at 19. 
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 Technology has also changed where legal work can be done. To begin, the difficulties 
posed by geographical distances between clients and attorneys are now overcome.45 Marketing 
of legal services is now global; providing more information to the potential client than more 
traditional forms of advertising.46 Moreover, through the use of on-line questionnaires, attorneys 
can gain the basic information necessary to initially evaluate the clients’ legal positioning.47 
 Beyond clients, current technology allows law firms to choose where employees, 
resources and services are located. For employees, this allows individuals the freedom to work 
from home or while traveling. On-line legal research services nullify the need for an extensive 
in-office legal library, or the accompanying personnel.48 Patent proofreading can be done 
overnight in India and ready for review the next morning.49 Even secretarial support need not be 
on the other side of the office door anymore.50 
  Maturing Marketplace  
 A basic concept of free market economics and trade is that of comparative advantage. 
The term refers to the opportunity costs of each participant in relation to every other participant 
with regard to the production of any given product or service.51 Note that every participant has a 
comparative advantage in something, even if one’s trading partner has an absolute advantage in 
                                                 
45 Arkfeld, supra note 42, at 12. 
46 Feature, supra note 39, at 50. 
47 Feature, supra note 39, at 51. 
48 Renee Deger, Firms Scramble For Cost-Cutting Legal Model, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 14, 2003, at 4. 
49 Molly McDonough, IP Goes Indian, 3 A.B.A. J. EREPORT 16, Apr. 23, 2004, at 6. 
50 Lin, Fargo, supra note 6. 
51 STEVEN SURANOVIC, INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY AND POLICY: THE RICARDIAN MODEL OF COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE, (The International Economics Study Center 1997-2005), 
http://internationalecon.com/v1.0/ch40/40c000.html. Using the fictitious example of wine and cloth production 
between England and Portugal to explain comparative advantage and opportunity cost: “[O]ne does not compare the 
monetary costs of production or even the resource costs (labor needed per unit of output) of production. Instead one 
must compare the opportunity costs of producing goods across countries. A country is said to have a comparative 
advantage in the production of a good (say cloth) if it can produce cloth at a lower opportunity cost than another 
country. The opportunity cost of cloth production is defined as the amount of wine that must be given up in order to 
produce one more unit of cloth. Thus England would have the comparative advantage in cloth production relative to 
Portugal if it must give up less wine to produce another unit of cloth than the amount of wine that Portugal would 
have to give up to produce another unit of cloth.” 
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everything.52 The significance of these facts is articulated in the Law of Comparative Advantage 
which purports that in a free market, each participant responds to market forces producing and 
trading according to each one’s relative advantage because doing so makes everyone better off 
than by remaining generalists and not trading.53 Simplistically, everyone does what he or she 
does best, or least worst, and then trades for what is needed because then everyone gets more in 
return for their efforts.  
  While comparative advantage is the rationale that economics provides for free trade, 
outsourcing is comparative advantage in action.54 Jobs move offshore when the comparative 
advantage in that industry shifts from one country to another. Historically, this shift happened in 
labor intensive sectors such as manufacturing. With the advances in communications technology 
though, white-collar jobs are shifting now too.55 Whatever the industry or era, competition is 
what provokes such shifts.56 Thus, as every industry faces some level of competition, knowing 
when an industry is at risk for losing jobs is key to assessing its vulnerability to outsourcing. 
 One signal that competition has reached a critical level is by the maturity of the 
marketplace. Mature markets are basically those industries with little growth potential so they 
seek ways to remain competitive by attempting to restructure and reinvent themselves; since 
profit margins have declined, they also seek ways of cutting costs.57 Accounting firms are among 
many service industries that faced mature marketplaces in the past forcing the industry to make 
the alterations it did.58 Some elements of a mature marketplace now present in the legal industry 
                                                 
52 Id. 
53 ALAN V. DEARDORFF, DEARDORFF'S GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, (2001), (Last Changed 
1/24/2005), at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/l.html#pagetop. 
54 Drezner, supra note 2.  
55 Drezner, supra note 2. 
56 Drezner, supra note 2. 
57 AmosWEB Economic GLOSS*arama: maturity stage at http://www.amosweb.com/cgi-
bin/gls.pl?fcd=dsp&key=maturity+stage. 
58 Bower, supra note 38. 
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give clues as to the status of the industry.59 Consolidation is the rapid increase in size of a service 
provider mainly due to mergers the demise of firms unable to compete. A few decades ago, only 
a few U.S. law firms employed over 100 attorneys.  Now there are many such firms, with a few 
who employ over 1,000 attorneys.60 Brand name recognition is also an important indicator of a 
mature market. While big name firms are well known in business circles,61 television advertising 
makes certain personal injury firms well known among consumers. Price competition and client 
sophistication complete this abbreviated list.62 
 Client driven 
  Client Demographics 
   Individuals Take Control 
 In matters of concern to individuals, pro se representation has grown to the point that it is 
in many areas the rule rather than the exception.63 Much of this change is the result of changes in 
the demographics of the country’s general population; with more education, more mobility, and 
advances in technology, individuals are demanding more control over their legal endeavors.64 
When individuals have not sought exclusive control by proceeding  pro se, they have sought 
partial, piecemeal assistance from attorneys forcing the legal profession to “unbundle” its 
traditional set of services.65 
   Entities Embrace the Power Shift from Seller to Buyer 
 In matters of concern to business entities, the current economy is considered a “buyers 
market” for legal services. That is, the power to dictate the terms of the transaction has shifted 
                                                 
59 Bower, supra note 38 at 18. 
60 Id. 
61 Bower, supra note 38. 
62 Bower, supra note 38 at 18. 
63 Feature, supra note 39, at 49. 
64 Feature, supra note 39, at 53. 
65 Id. 
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from the attorney-seller to the client-buyer.66 Many larger more sophisticated clients have 
zealously embraced this power shift67 especially since the recessionary climate has placed 
efficiency and cost cutting demands on these business too. One tool used to select an attorney is 
the Request For Proposal (RFP).68 Designed as a means of comparing one attorney against 
another, clients have also used it strategically as a pretext for gaining negotiating leverage or as a 
covert way to eliminate whom their adversaries may hire.69 
With this in mind, attorneys must formulate their own strategies and goals for participating cost-
effectively in a RFP, but the point of the exercise is clear: the client is in control. 
  Billing methods 
 Clients are now finding strength in complaining about the traditional attorney billable 
hour, the historical cornerstone of the legal profession.70 For clients, it is prohibitive of budgetary 
accuracy.71 Monitoring work as it is done and the billing as it comes in only increases the cost of 
the service for the client.72 Additionally, hourly billing can function as a disincentive to the 
attorney to act efficiently.73 
 In response, some clients have sought flat fee arrangements.74 Such arrangements bring 
budgetary certainty to the client and shift the risk of cost overruns to the law firm.75 Clients who 
                                                 
66 William J. Flannery, Jr., Just Say No: When Law Firms Should NOT Participate In Beauty Contests, THE WJF 
INSTITUTE, at http://www.wjfinstitute.com/articles_3.htm. 
67 Id. 
68 Bower, supra note 38. 
69 Id. (If the potential client reveals too much information in the RFP process it could be covered by MRPC 1.18 
protecting the confidentiality of potential clients thus creating a possible conflict of interest under MPRC 1.7 or 1.9 
and limiting for who else the attorney may work. “Sounds paranoid? It happened a few years ago to one of the 
nation's ten largest firms. All the evidence suggests that a preliminary interview was a purposeful tactic used by the 
prospective client to make sure this great firm was put out of commission.”). 
70 William J. Flannery, Jr., 10 Reasons Why Law Firm Marketing Is Failing And How To Fix The Problems, THE 
WJF INSTITUTE, at http://www.wjfinstitute.com/articles_9.htm. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Peter D. Zeughauser, Flat Fees: The Hidden Risk, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Sept. 1996, at 50. 
75 Id. 
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value this certainty are willing to pay a premium to obtain it.76 For these clients, budgetary 
certainty signals corporate health, which translates to increases in stock prices and the 
executives’ own portfolios.77 Where the billable hour detracts from attorney efficiency, the flat 
fee enhances it.78 Generally this is done at the expense of the quality of the attorney’s work 
product as attorneys seek shortcuts to maintain the profitability of the arrangement.79 
Outsourcing In The Medical Profession 
 To understand exactly how the outsourcing of core legal services will affect the 
profession it will aide to look at a similar industry which already uses the practice. The medical 
profession has sought numerous solutions over the years to combat the high costs inherent to 
quality medical care. Stemming from a combination of reasons including education costs, 
malpractice insurance rates, and a need for specialized equipment, these costs have forced direct 
providers of medical care to seek relief where they can. In large part, technological innovations 
were and are the answer. Beginning with the outsourcing of medical records transcription, the 
medical profession is now using technology to outsource the reading of radiological scans and 
lab slides.80 These new practices are part of a larger area of medicine known as telemedicine.81 
Other recent uses of technology in telemedicine are not outsourcing per se, but they help 
illustrate to what extent the boundaries and requirements of a profession can be altered: now 
school children in Arizona and Alzheimer patients living in rural Oklahoma both can visit the 
                                                 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 More U.S. jobs coming to India, REDIFF.COM, Jan. 07, 2004, at 
http://www.rediff.com/money/2004/jan/07bpo.htm; Lindsey Tanner, CT scans, MRIs sent overseas in outsourcing 
twist, N. COUNTRY TIMES, Dec. 6, 2004, available at 
http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2004/12/06/news/nation/16_37_3912_6_04.txt. 
81 ATSP TELEMEDICINE GLOSSARY at http://www2.telemedtoday.com/glossary/index.html (definition of 
telemedicine). 
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doctor via videoconferencing, and cellular camera phones were tested successfully for their value 
in transmitting useable pictures to doctors for wound evaluations.82 
 Overall, these alterations in the way medical care is delivered to the patient seem to be 
positive. These alterations mean more people have access to services that were previously 
unavailable by removing the barriers of physical distance and time, with apparently little 
detriment.83 In the case of radiologists, outsourcing overseas has helped alleviate a real shortage 
of qualified personnel for a service needed around the clock as most of the outsourced scans are 
read by U.S. trained and licensed doctors.84 Admittedly, the effects of outsourcing here are not 
typical, in part because it is equally credentialed personnel performing the work. However, the 
possibility that this may change is real: a pilot program in India is testing a limited service using 
“Indian doctors who are neither U.S. licensed nor board certified.”85 
 In spite of its many virtues, the practice of outsourcing in medicine raises many of the 
same concerns and potential liabilities seen in the practice of law; issues surrounding the quality 
of service provided, adequate training of personnel, proper licensing and the confidentiality of 
information. All of these issues deserve consideration, but only two will be highlighted here. 
First, medical professional are licensed and regulated by the individual states in which they 
practice just as attorneys are. Thus, they also have a similar prohibition to the legal professions’ 
Model Rule 5.5 against unauthorized practice and similar difficulties with consistency of 
                                                 
82 Mary Bustamante, Telemedicine Program: Aching ear on TV, TUCSON CITIZEN Feb. 4, 2005, 
http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/index.php?page=local&story_id=020405a5_tele_doc; Cell Phones Cameras Put 
Doctors in the Picture, Health Day News, Feb. 21, 2005, http://health.yahoo.com/news/_58750; UT Southwestern 
doctors track Oklahoma Alzheimer’s patients via telemedicine, UT SOUTHWESTERN MED. CENTER CURRENT NEWS 
RELEASE, Feb. 10, 2005, at http://www.utsouthwestern.edu/utsw/cda/dept37389/files/206918.html. 
83 Holly Epstein Ojalvo, Exploring the video frontier High-tech transmissions of sight and sound let physicians give 
patients more – and better – care, ACP OBSERVER, June 1995, 
http://www.acponline.org/journals/news/jun95/telemed.htm 
84 Tanner, supra note 80. 
85 Id. 
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definition and enforcement.86 In the age of outsourcing and telemedicine, current regulations on 
the practice of medicine are outmoded, but attempts to create a national license for physicians 
have failed.87 Interestingly, nurses have been relatively successful on this front creating a 
licensure compact based on mutual recognition between jurisdictions which several states have 
adopted.88 
 The second area worth highlighting is the confidentiality of patient information. In the 
medical field, maintaining the privacy of patient information is mandated by federal law.89 The 
security of outsourced information was called into question a couple of years ago over a wage 
dispute. A woman in Pakistan was employed transcribing patient records. When a dispute with 
her employer over back wages had not been resolved to her satisfaction, she threatened to expose 
personal patient information.90 Regardless of who was right in the wage dispute, this shows the 
power possessed by such a subcontractor, and the ease of using or abusing that power. A client’s 
legal information can be as personal as medical information. The fact that the security of the 
latter could be so easily breached is warning to the legal profession of the potential risks 
involved. And while contracts may decide who assumes that risk between the law firm and the 
outsourcing company, the ill will such a breach would create among current clients and the loss 
of reputation generally, cannot be contracted around and will fall fully upon the law firm.  
 
 
  
                                                 
86 See infra Unauthorized Practice of Law. 
87 Ronald L. Scott, State Licensure Issues Hamper Telemedicine, Nov. 25, 1998, at 
http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlawperspectives/HealthPolicy/981125State.html. 
88 Glenn W. Wachter, Interstate Licensure for Telenursing, The TIE, May 2002 at 
http://tie.telemed.org/articles/article.asp?path=consumer&article=telenursingLicensure_gw_tie02.xml. 
89 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). 
90 Deger, supra note 48. 
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Outsourcing in the Legal Profession – What has been done so far 
 Domestic 
 The offshoring of legal work is a relatively recent occurrence. Outsourcing domestically 
within the legal profession, however is not. Like every other type of business, law firms 
motivated by potential cost savings and better resource allocation began experimenting with the 
practice by contracting out basic functions incidental to running a business such as accounting or 
data processing.91 Since this conservative beginning, law firms find evermore creative ways to 
outsource. Secretarial support is now just a phone call away in Fargo, North Dakota.92 Editors for 
almost any document are as close as the internet.93 Legal research companies, by supplying 
reliable information, have established their worth to small firms, large corporations and even 
legal publishers.94 Entrepreneurial attorneys hold themselves out as “wholesale” attorneys, 
capitalizing on their research and writing skills while avoiding the adversarial arena.95 For the 
less entrepreneurial, there are attorney staffing agencies akin to temporary work agencies for 
other types of work. In fact, one of the best known temporary work agencies is involved in the 
placement of attorneys in temporary assignments under the name Kelly Law Registry.96 
 In spite of its popularity, some firms have yet to outsource.  Beyond the boilerplate 
concerns over reputation or increased exposure to malpractice liability, the primary truth for a 
few is simply their firm has yet to be economically induced.97 According to the economic 
indicators discussed previously in this paper, in time, such firms will find economics come to 
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call. Interestingly, when that time comes, the law firm may be asking which of its own functions 
can be outsourced, but it is just as probable that the law firm may be asked to be the outsource 
provider. In-house counsel of large corporations was one of the first groups to outsource legal 
work. Taking a cue from fellow departments within the corporation, in-house counsels began 
treating law firms like any other service provider the corporation contracted with soliciting bids 
through a Request For Proposal (RFP).98 Traditionally solicited and submitted on paper, some 
companies are experimenting with online formats likened to Priceline, the online discount travel 
site.99 In this format, law firms are invited to bid for a company’s business in different 
“’competitive bidding rooms’” based on areas of expertise and hosted by an online auction 
provider.100 
 “Priceline for corporate lawyers,” may be the forefront, but the pioneer and current giant 
of corporate legal outsourcing is Dupont. Incredibly successful and popular for Dupont as well as 
numerous other firms, the 13 year-old Legal Model has meant a loss of billable hours and 
training opportunities for law firms. 101 The reason for this is Dupont’s Model restructured what 
it meant to outsource legal services by functionalizing and then directly controlling the legal 
work at the corporate level; taking what work can be done by non-lawyers, for example initial 
witness interviews or document review, and outsourcing that work directly to non-law firms that 
specialize in those services leaving only that which must be done by lawyers to the lawyers.102 
Candidly, Dupont has said, beyond immediate savings, a large motivation in using the Model is 
to pressure law firms into improving their service and change their billing.103 To that end, 
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Dupont is reportedly satisfied with the financial results of the Model.104 Dupont’s example does 
leave open the question of whether this extreme fragmentation detrimentally impairs the synergy 
of proximity and totality essential to certain matters.105 
 Practices such as the online bidding and the Dupont model show how easily certain work 
can and has become impervious to restrictions of physical location and/or of the perceived 
totality of a process. This modern reality coupled with constant economic pressures, whether 
systemic or client driven, has led to the newest practice of outsourcing overseas or offshoring. 
 Offshore 
 Offshoring of legal work, although in its infancy,106 seems to be drawing a certain 
measure of interest from all levels of the legal industry. The more adventuresome are making 
solid commitments. Large corporations with their own legal departments are seeing offshoring 
tested by the likes of General Electric Co. and Cisco Systems.107 Some recent law school 
graduates, such as the founders of Lexadigm Solutions a company which outsources legal 
research to India, are seizing the opportunity to steer their own course and are already seeing the 
rewards.108 Zachary Bossenbroek, a 2002 law school graduate and Puneet Mohey, a 2003 
graduate started the Michigan-based Lexadigm in February 2004. Only months into the 
endeavor, the firm had to increase its billing rates by 1/3 in an attempt to control demand. Still 
other adventures can be found in the area of Intellectual Property (IP) law as many patent 
attorneys have sent the tedious and time-consuming chore of patent proofreading overseas.109 
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 The more skeptical in the legal profession are testing the practice piecemeal to see if and 
how it might enhance or complement their existing practice. Smaller law firms have sought the 
assistance of outsourcing firms when they needed to compete with larger, better financed 
opponents and in doing so, managed to hold their own.110 The general counsel for BorgWarner 
first chose to test outsourcing when she had a multi-state employment law question she needed 
researched, because it was much less expensive than other resources available to her.111 Satisfied, 
she has since sent the same firm a second project.112 Not everyone who has tried outsourcing has 
been satisfied from the outset, however. Two different IP firms experienced similar start-up 
difficulties having to try multiple firms and invest in the training of the overseas workers to 
receive a usable product.113 These difficulties ranged from substandard writing, sometimes to the 
point of having to completely rewrite the final product, to the borderline comical when one law 
firm had sent the inventor’s notes and a template for the final product to India and received back 
the notes pasted into the template with a bill for $1,500.114 
 For the truly skeptical, it is these initial disasters that reinforce the many reasons why 
they have not, or will not, offshore legal work. For now, this is skepticism is the prevailing 
attitude of the industry, much to the disappointment of outsourcing’s proponents considering the 
potential outsourcing market for legal support services alone is conservatively estimated to be 
two billion dollars.115 Numerous reasons are cited for this attitude, including the legal industry’s 
propensity for slower growth, attorney concerns over quality of the work done and maintaining 
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their reputations, the current political nature of the issue, and client concerns over the security 
and privacy of their information.116 
 Specific to the issues of information security and privacy, financial services companies 
and call centers have lobbied for years to get the Indian data protection laws to mirror those of 
the U.S. and Europe, without progress.117 Lacking such legal protection in the country where the 
work is performed, companies providing legal outsourcing services have taken different 
approaches to alleviating client concerns over the handling of information. One chose to set up a 
U.S. presence, seeing it as a “vote of accountability.”118 Another sought a technological solution: 
disallowing its Indian workers the ability to work on files locally, instead, the workers 
temporarily access the files, “and all information is stored on client servers in the home 
country.”119 
 Realizing that the forays taken thus far into outsourcing will have to prove out, and 
realizing that workable solutions must be found to the additional complexities of outsourcing, 
those hazarding projections still expect outsourcing to become a standard practice of the legal 
industry120 and estimate a potential 20% -25% of legal work could be offshored.121 Thus, the 
question of whether or not to take up the practice of outsourcing is one individual law firms are 
likely to be asking themselves in the near future. In answering the question, law firms need to go 
beyond number crunching and the bottom line and explore the areas of ethical concern laid out in 
the next section.   
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Areas of Ethical Concern for Legal Profession 
 Like any business, when attorneys chose to outsource numerous legal concerns must be 
addressed: how the risk of potential law suits will be allocated,122  how the courts define an 
employee,123 and particular to Intellectual Property (IP) is the risk that outsourcing overseas may 
run afoul of export control laws.124 However, because attorneys are professionals bound to a 
code of ethics, they must consider the ethical implications of their business decisions and not 
simply the legal ones. The A.B.A. Model Rules of Professional Conduct are comprehensive, 
covering most every aspect of legal practice. Thus, when examining the ethical implications of 
outsourcing, multiple rules come into play. Although many of the rules intertwine, this paper will 
attempt to explore separately merely the areas of greatest concern namely Conflicts of Interest, 
maintaining Client Confidences, Disclosures to the Client generally and specifically to Legal 
Fees and Responsible Supervision, and also the Unauthorized Practice of Law. 
 Conflicts of Interest 
 Outsourcing legal work is analogous to using temporary attorneys and touches on some 
of the same areas of ethical concern: conflicts of interest, confidentiality, and fee sharing. The 
practices are analogous because in both cases the principal attorney or firm is subcontracting a 
portion of work, which the principal had contracted to do for the client. In 1988, the A.B.A. 
addressed the issue of temporary attorneys in Formal Opinion 88-356.125 Thus the discussion in 
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the following sections, while referring to temporary attorneys, is directly applicable to the 
practice of outsourcing legal work.126 
 Conflicts of interest for potential or current clients are provided for under Model Rule 
1.7; for former clients under 1.9.127 Rule 1.7 recognizes that the conflicting interests of clients 
can exist to varying degrees and so it is not a blanket prohibition, but rather it sets the acceptable 
parameters within which the attorney must practice law. The Rule begins by stating that an 
attorney may not represent a client if that representation will be directly adverse to another client, 
or if the representation will be materially limited in either of two ways: by the attorney’s own 
interests, or an attorney’s duty to another client, former client, or to a third party.128 It then 
retracts from this broad proclamation by allowing the attorney to represent a client despite the 
presence of a conflict if four conditions are met including the informed written consent of each 
affected client, and the attorney’s reasonable belief that he/she will be remain able to represent 
each affected client competently.129 
 M.R. 1.9 limits what new clients and matters an attorney can accept based on whether the 
matter is substantially related to one handled for the former client and whether the new/potential 
client’s interests are materially adverse to those of the former client.130 Rule 1.9 also prohibits an 
attorney from using information gained in prior matters if doing so would disadvantage the 
former client, permissible disclosures under Rule 1.6 or 3.3 aside.131 
 Any attorney who directly represents a client is bound by the constraints of these two 
Rules. Any attorney that is only associated with a firm who represents the client may also be 
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bound by these same constraints. Under the first scenario, the A.B.A. clearly found “that a 
temporary attorney who works on a matter for a client of a firm with whom the temporary lawyer 
is temporarily associated ‘represents’ that clients for the purposes of Rules 1.7 and 1.9.”132 In 
practice this means a temporary attorney would not be able to work on matters for different 
clients of different firms if those matters were materially adverse under Rule 1.7,133 and that Rule 
1.9 would limit what work the temporary attorney could do in the future.134 
 The A.B.A. found the second scenario more difficult to determine. Often, attorneys who 
are members of the same firm are considered to have represented a client just as the attorneys 
who work directly on a matter.135 This can be true for temporary attorneys as well if they are 
found to be “associated” with the conflicting firm. The question then becomes under what 
circumstances does this occur? Here is where the difficulty of the scenario lies and why the 
A.B.A.’s answer was essentially – it depends.136 Formal agreements, mutual access to 
confidential information, even the manner in which the attorneys publicly present the 
relationship; all are factors to be considered in determining if the firm’s conflict has been 
imputed to the temporary attorney.137 
 Complicating the issue further, consider to what extent a temporary attorney who does 
not work directly on a matter should be imputed with that firm’s conflicts when the association 
with the firm is ended. In other words, what degree of loyalty, to any given client, should the 
profession expect, from those members that are no longer, and were only originally fictionally 
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connected to that particular client? Broad and strict enforcement of Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10 
would result in lost opportunities for attorneys, as well as the loss of choice of counsel for the 
client.138 Ultimately, the A.B.A. determined that the more remote the connection between the 
temporary attorney and the firm, the less enforcement served the purpose of these rules.139 This 
determination may serve for now, but consider that as outsourcing of legal work becomes more 
prevalent, such conflicts may be more common. Additionally, as the offshore market also 
matures, such outsourced work may end up being done by a limited number of legal shops 
focusing on specific types of activity. U.S. law firms may then find their outsource providers 
conflicted out by previous work for adverse parties, or that they themselves are conflicted out by 
the prior alliances of the outsource provider. 
 Client Confidentiality 
 Entwined in the issue of conflicts and client loyalty is the issue of maintaining the 
confidentiality of a client’s information. Access to information regarding any of a firm’s clients 
can be a determinative factor in deciding whether or not an attorney is associated with that 
firm.140 Such access can also determine whether or not an attorney has impermissibly breached 
the confidence of a client under Rule 1.6.141 Note however, that the scope of Rule 1.6’s 
prohibition against revealing client confidences is not limited to information gained through the 
representation of the client.142 
 Two practices can help both the firm and the individual temporary attorney avoid 
problems in this area: good record keeping and screening. Accurate and detailed records 
maintained by both the firm and the temporary attorney tell which clients and which matters the 
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temporary attorney was exposed to during his/her association with the firm. Screening, if 
acceptable methods are followed, preemptively strikes at the question of exposure in an attempt 
to render it moot by isolating attorneys from information regarding other clients. 
 Screening issues can arise in the context of either concurrent representations or 
successive representations. The acceptance by the courts of the defense seems to rest on which 
context is present; accepting screening more readily involving subsequent representations. 
Speculative analysis proffers as explanation the fact that screening cannot solve the problem of 
dual, conflicting loyalties.143 
 The courts are not alone in their trepidation towards screening. Screening is a contentious 
issue among attorneys as well and some distinctions should be made. The debate between 
attorneys rests on whether one feels clients deserve greater peace of mind and control over the 
release of their information, or whether one feels a client’s choice of counsel and a lawyer’s 
professional autonomy are paramount.144 Recognizing this debate among its members, the 
A.B.A. most recently undertook the issue of screening with its Ethics 2000 Commission. The 
Commission proposed changing Rule 1.10(c) to permit screening as a means to remove an 
imputed disqualification and the requisite consent of the affected client. When the final vote 
came down in 2002, though, the proposal was defeated.145 Thus the current A.B.A. Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct do not allow screening as an acceptable cure for imputed conflicts146 
except in the case of government lawyers who move to the private sector.147 
 The A.B.A. notwithstanding, screening is recognized in a handful of jurisdictions as a 
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defense to the rebuttable presumption of imputed disqualification.148 This is because either the 
state has incorporated it into its ethics code, or because courts in those jurisdictions have found it 
an acceptable measure of protection against exposure of client confidences.149 Whether a court 
finds the measures taken by a firm to be adequate is fact specific and decided on a case by case 
basis.150 
 Regardless of one’s philosophy or a particular courts attitude towards screening, it is a 
good proactive business practice whenever the possibility of imputed disqualifications arises. 
This is doubly true when outsourcing, as firms must not only be cognizant and diligent in the 
work records and screening of its own attorneys, but they must ensure the same confidence and 
competence in those of a vendor. The responsibility for upholding U.S. professional legal 
standards and the corresponding risk of litigation if those standards are not upheld rests solely on 
the U.S. firm.151 Possibilities for exposure run from the inadvertent assignment of a conflicting 
matter by the overseas firm to an ineligible employee, to the more fantastical yet actual 
occurrence within the medical field where a woman in Pakistan who was hired to transcribe 
medical records threatened to expose confidential patient information if she were not paid the 
wages owed her.152 In either case, the U.S. firm’s best protection beyond a strong working 
relationship with the overseas vendor is a comprehensive contract imposing U.S. legal ethical 
standards on the vendor as well as choice of law, choice of venue, and binding arbitration 
clauses.153 
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 Disclosure to the Client 
 Disclosure to the client is a recurring theme in the Model Rules, appearing in almost 
every context. Three areas in particular interact to form a trifecta of concern when outsourcing.  
These are the lawyer’s services, the supervision of the work and the fees charged by the 
lawyer.154 An attorney’s services are addressed in Rule 7.1. This rule speaks not to the type of 
services that a lawyer may provide, rather, the rule’s focus is the client, stipulating that the client 
know and understand exactly who is representing him/her.155 Rule 7.1 is in the same vein as 
other Model Rules concerned with what the client knows about his/her representation and what 
the client consents to concerning the same.156 The purpose of M.R. 7.1 is to prevent the client 
from being misled as to the true nature of the professional relationships and resources available 
to the contact attorney for the client’s representation.157 Since even the A.B.A. has conceded the 
impossibility of defining categorically and clearly such terms as “alliance,” “network,” or 
“associated,”158 their use requires the accompaniment of a meaningful description.159 As broad as 
the scope of M.R. 7.1 appears on its face, it does not demand full disclosure under all 
circumstances. Rather its requirements are tempered by M.R. 5.1 and M.R. 5.3 concerning the 
supervision of those performing the work, and by M.R. 1.5 concerning fee arrangements. To best 
illustrate the interplay of these rules with the requirements of M.R. 7.1, the particulars of each 
area will be discussed separately.  
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  Responsible Supervision 
 Rule 5.1 and its companion 5.3 speak to the supervisory responsibilities of attorneys 
towards other attorneys and towards non-lawyer assistants.160 5.1(a) charges all partners or 
managers of firms with the oversight of all the attorneys in the firm.161 Individually, regardless of 
managerial authority or partnership status, under 5.1(b) any attorney with direct supervisory 
authority over another must make reasonable efforts to ensure the supervised attorney follows 
the Model Rules.162  5.1(c) then lays out the circumstance for when one attorney shall be held 
responsible for the conduct of another.163 The comments explain that without more, a supervising 
attorney who does nothing to ensure the ethical conduct of those being supervised can still 
violate paragraph (b).164 Rule 5.3 reads similarly, but applies to non-lawyer assistants.165 
 As applied to outsourcing, the consensus of industry experts is that the work acceptably 
adheres to theses rules because the work remains under the supervision and control of the 
contracting lawyers, the assumption being that the contracting lawyers actively monitor and 
review the work as well as the outsource providers.166 Additionally, because the contracting 
attorney is considered the supervising attorney for purposes of 5.1 and 5.3, industry experts also 
agree it is the contracting lawyer that is liable for any problems with the work or any ethical 
violations committed by the outsource provider.167 168 This is one of the reasons that some refuse 
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to send legal work offshore or outsource domestically to a centralized location.169 Such people 
feel that the loss of physical proximity and the inability for immediate face to face 
communication impairs the process to the point that the quality of the end product is significantly 
lessened and the supervising attorneys’ liability for that end product unacceptably increased.170 
 Beyond the basic duties and liabilities laid out above, Rules 5.1 and 5.3 can trigger the 
additional duty of disclosure to the client under 7.1 depending on the form of the arrangement. In 
analyzing the varying arrangements firms might have with temporary attorneys, the A.B.A. set 
for the following guidelines in it Formal Opinion 88-356.171 If the work is done independently, 
then the use of the temporary attorney must be disclosed to the client and the client must give 
consent for use of the temporary attorney.172 If however, the temporary attorney is to work under 
the direct supervision of the retaining firm, use of the temporary attorney need not be disclosed 
to the client nor is the client’s consent necessary.173 
 These guidelines seem to suggest that the deciding factor in whether disclosure and client 
consent is required is the mere locality of personnel. In reality, it is the control and oversight 
involved that is at issue. These broad proclamations leave unclear whether outsourcing as a form 
of business alliance falls in the category requiring disclosure to and consent from the client. 
Some believe clients who are not told of the arrangement to outsource in advance will file for 
malpractice subsequently.174 Those who believe the Rules impose no professional obligation to 
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disclose still readily admit that “there is a ‘relationship obligation’ to bring such arrangements to 
the attention of the clients.”175 At minimum, by choosing a course of nondisclosure, an attorney 
risks alienating the client; at maximum, the attorney risks potential malpractice. 
  Legal Fees 
 The second rule that tempers the broad disclosure requirement of M.R. 7.1 is M.R. 1.5, 
simply entitled “Fees.” This rule proclaims that an attorney may not charge an “unreasonable” 
fee setting forth a non-exclusive list of eight criteria for determining what is reasonable.176 These 
criteria range from the difficulty of the work, the experience and reputation of the lawyer, to the 
customary amount charged for the locality and to whether the fee is fixed or contingent.177 Later, 
paragraphs (c) and (d) clarify the use of contingency fees, while paragraph (b) first ensures that 
whatever the financial arrangement, the details are communicated to the client, promptly, and 
preferably in writing.178 Most important to the discussion here, however, are M.R. 1.5’s limits on 
the division of fees between lawyers who are not in the same firm in paragraph (e).179 
 Paragraph (e) states that for there to be a proper division of fees each attorney assumes 
joint responsibility, each attorney receives an amount proportional to the services provided, the 
client’s agreement to the division is secured in writing, and the total fee is reasonable.180 
Reflective of M.R. 1.5 as a whole and seemingly complete, in dictating how lawyers may share 
fees paragraph (e) leaves open the question of how fees are to be shared with non-lawyers. 
Model Rule 5.4 answers the question directly in its first two paragraphs: (a) prohibits a lawyer’s 
sharing of legal fees with non-lawyers, noting a few exceptions, and (b) blanketly prohibits 
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lawyers from partnering with non-lawyers; both prohibitions in place to protect a lawyer’s 
professional independence.181 
 At first glance, the practice of outsourcing would seem to conflict with the first of these 
prohibitions even if the specifics of the outsourcing arrangement did not go so far as to violate 
the second. Some clarification of terms at this point will assist the analysis. First, the Model 
Rules use the word “sharing” to mean a direct division of the legal fee received by the lawyer 
from the client.182 Second, reasonable compensation paid for services rendered by a non-lawyer 
from the legal fee is not considered sharing.183 Last, clarifying what might be obvious, non-
lawyer is anyone who is not a lawyer.184 Going forward, analyzing first the prohibition against 
partnering with non-lawyers in the context of outsourcing, then becomes an easy violation to 
avoid. This is because outsourcing is normally done under a service contract, not a partnership 
agreement. If stronger business ties are sought, partnering with other attorneys in other 
jurisdictions, even foreign jurisdictions, is permissible as long as the integrity of applicable 
ethical mandates is maintained.185 
 Turning to the fees themselves, the equation becomes more complex and the answer more 
fact specific. Lawyer or non-lawyer, if the fee is charged to the client as a disbursement M.R. 
1.5(e) is inapplicable, the outsourcing arrangement must be disclosed to the client, and no 
surcharge may be added beyond those cost directly related to the service unless agreed to by the 
client.186 Lawyer or non-lawyer, if the outsourcing is charged to the client as a fee for legal 
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services and the outsource provider is paid a reasonable compensation from the fee, then M.R. 
1.5(e) is inapplicable, although M.R. 1.5 (a)’s mandate that the total fee be reasonable remains in 
effect.187 Finally, only if the outsource provider is a lawyer may the fee be billed as a legal fee 
and directly divided subject to both M.R. 1.5 (a) and (e)’s requirements of reasonableness and 
disclosure.188 The typical arrangement described by this last scenario is a percentage division of 
a contingency fee. It is important to note that such an arrangement with a legal research firm is 
not allowed as it would be an impermissible sharing of legal fees with a non-lawyer because 
although lawyers are employed to perform the research, the research firm itself is considered 
non-lawyer under the Model Rules.189 
 Unauthorized Practice of Law 
 The last area of ethical concern this paper will address is the Unauthorized Practice of 
Law. At its most basic, the unauthorized practice of law is the performance of legal work in the 
absence of proper licensing.190 Unfortunately, the phrasing of M.R. 5.5 lends little more to this 
basic statement. M.R. 5.5 does clarify that a lawyer can violate the rule by his/her own acts or by 
assisting others to practice law without authorization.191 Where the rule deteriorates, though, is in 
deferring the definition of “the practice of law” to that of each jurisdiction.192 Allowing for 
individualized definitions was easier for the A.B.A., but has proven significantly more difficult 
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for each jurisdiction and its practitioners, resulting in a confusing variety of definitions and 
conflicting case law with several jurisdictions failing to establish any definition at all.193 
 This inconsistency in definition and enforcement coupled with the dynamic evolution of 
the profession from its traditional form of general practitioner is cultivating vociferous cries for 
the renovation of this cornerstone rule.194 
Ostensibly enacted to protect the public from the unqualified,195 the Rule’s detractors insist 
instead that the original and continuing purpose is protectionism pure and simple.196 More 
serious than its intent, though, are the questions raised as to whether the prohibition is effective; 
whether it measurably protects the public from unregulated incompetence.197 Arguably, 
lessoning restrictions will serve the public better because doing so would create a greater 
availability of lower cost legal services, in turn making the protection or vindication of rights 
more cost effective for more people.198 
 When outsourcing, there are two ways an attorney could run afoul of the restriction on 
the unauthorized practice of law. The first and most likely way is for the attorney to outsource a 
task or function that is considered to be the practice of law to persons lacking the proper 
credentials thereby impermissibly aiding others in the unauthorized practice of law. For this 
situation to occur, the outsource provider could be located anywhere, and regardless of whether 
the outsourcing attorney’s home jurisdiction finds the violation or the jurisdiction where the 
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work was performed finds it,199 it will be the outsourcing attorney who is held accountable.200 
The second, more remote yet still probable way is for the attorney to transiently practice law or 
offer to practice law201 in a jurisdiction within which he/she is not authorized. In California, for 
instance, this second form of transgression is less remote than is comfortable for most attorneys 
as merely a virtual presence in the state can warrant sanctions.202 
 As valid as these scenarios are, there are those that see an attack on the practice of 
outsourcing under M.R. 5.5 as dubious.203 Partly, this is due from the general lack of a workable 
definition of what the practice of law is and because provisions elsewhere in the Model Rules 
allow for legal work to be done by a variety of people as long as the work is properly supervised 
by a properly authorized attorney.204 It is this allowance for supervision that disinfects 
outsourcing in the eyes of most experts.205 Additionally, outsource providers themselves steer 
clear of offering legal advice.206 The savvier ones have disclaimers disavowing any practice of 
law, forming of attorney-client relationships, or authoritative finality over the work.207 
Policy Considerations - Effect on Profession 
 Public Perception 
 Making certain that the practical choices the profession makes do not constitute outright 
violations of the ethical rules, it is equally important to ensure those choices do not lessen the 
integrity of the profession either. Debating the merits of outsourcing of legal work, the current 
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President of the A.B.A. found the practice acceptable and supportive of clients who were seeking 
way to cut legal cost.208 Alternatively, a former A.B.A. President goes so far as to describe 
outsourcing as the exploitation of the workers overseas.209 While the focus of this paper is not so 
far reaching, the underlying essence of this view is applicable. Cost cutting focuses on money 
whereas seeing outsourcing as exploitation focuses on morality.210 In order to maintain the 
integrity of the profession it is often forgotten that the integrity of individual members must be 
maintained as well.211 
 With the plethora of disparaging lawyer jokes in existence, with both the Congress and 
the President attacking litigation,212 it is easy to see that much of the public holds a tainted view 
of the profession. At issue is not the general public’s sense of humor, rather it is the effect this 
image has on the profession. Andrew M. Perlman in his article, Toward A Unified Theory Of 
Professional Regulation, put forth that substantial evidence exists to indicate the public’s image 
of lawyers has little correlation to the public’s confidence in the justice system as a whole, along 
with the recommendation that lawyers should concentrate more on ethical substance rather than 
image.213 Assuming the truth of this contention, arguably, image still matters. Consider the 
aforementioned federal legislation. The legislation basically attacks attorneys and either 
demonstrates how deeply some believe the negative image of the profession, or it demonstrates 
how far some are willing to use the image to advance their own interests. Wherever the truth lies 
is irrelevant because the effect of either motivation is directly detrimental to the profession. 
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 The profession has struggled unsuccessfully to refute its sullied image. Partly this is due 
to the fine line that attorneys must tread between zealous advocacy and ethical decorum, a line 
that is sometimes difficult enough for lawyers to discern let alone obvious or reasonable to the 
public. Another reason this view persists is the limited personal interaction that most people have 
with attorneys. Personal interaction can be highly influential since the nature of people is to trust 
more that which is experienced personally over that which the profession or others contend it to 
be. It is also the nature of people to relay their experiences with a tendency to relay the bad more 
often than good. On a limited scale, this is why reputation can make or break an attorney’s 
practice.214 On a larger scale, it contributes to the public retaining its tainted view of the 
profession and points to the persuasive power of individuals within the profession to alter that 
perception. 
 This persuasive power is inherent to the lawyer/client relationship. People turn to lawyers 
because they need counseling on a matter or an expert in a given area. Thus the very reason 
people seek lawyers, for their knowledge and professional judgment, sets up the power 
differential of the relationship: one in need of help and the other with the ability to provide it. It 
is the responsibility of the attorney to ensure that this disparity is not exacerbated nor the 
inherent power of his/her position abused. The Model Rules place this responsibility upon the 
attorney in numerous ways: by requiring decisions regarding the objectives of representation be 
made by the client, by requiring the attorney to inform and consult with the client, and by 
limiting what the client can be charged.215 
 Beyond the Model Rules though, if a client does not perceive himself or herself to be the 
attorney’s equal, the value that the attorney places on a service or a skill will likely be the value 
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the client adopts for that service or skill. So while on the one hand an attorney may insist that the 
legal research sent overseas be performed by highly educated, well trained personnel, the 
attorney implies with the other hand that the basic skills of legal research and writing now 
requisite of most law degrees conferred in the U.S. is really only worth a fraction of that paid to 
similarly educated workers located here in the United States.216 By discounting these skills, the 
attorney subtly discounts his/her own value. Less subtle and more immediate, is the impact that 
such decisions will have on the newest lawyers who tend to be the ones assigned such work: 
decreasing the rates a client can be charged for their services and in turn the salary they can 
command.217 
 For those attorneys who are being driven to outsourcing by their clients, the end result is 
the same devaluation of the basic skills and worker, but the damage to the senior attorney is far 
greater. Instead of a subtle self degradation, accommodation of the client here is a concession by 
the attorney that the client’s lesser valuation of his/her skills is the truer valuation making future 
negotiations more difficult and leaving the attorney constantly justifying his/her own worth. 
 Contrary to what some promote, image may not be everything. It does, however, have a 
measure of power.218 
An attorney whose actions reinforce the traditional view of lawyers as more reptilian than human 
only serves to perpetuate the publics’ belief that all attorneys soullessly focus on money rather 
than the client or even the law.219 Conversely, an attorney whose choices reflect an adherence to 
a basic moral code promotes an image of the profession as ethically sound, one whose focus goes 
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beyond the bottom line.220 As stated in the beginning of this section, maintaining the integrity of 
the profession involves maintaining the integrity of individual members. Even if one agrees with 
the criticism that the Model Code of Professional Responsibility fails in this regard, being 
nothing more than a guide to the minimal behaviors necessary to avoid sanctions, the fact 
remains that it is the individual attorney who chooses his/her course of action and the 
professional image he/she conveys.221 
 Creation of Inferior Class of Lawyers 
 As technology advances and client demands for lower cost and greater control 
commoditize legal services, lawyers may find themselves commoditized as well. Presented as an 
argument against the legal industry’s wholesale switch to flat fee arrangements from the 
traditional hour rate is something called the “ValueJet proposition.”  Named for the infamous 
low-cost airline, one of whose fleet crashed into the Florida Everglades because of a mislabeled 
oxygen canister, this proposition illustrates how a something simple can have tremendous reach 
and impact.222 The basis of the proposition is that “In a free marketplace, rewards create an 
incentive for behavior, and if you take away a reward, the behavior likewise goes away.”223 In 
the case of the different billing methods, the incentive to produce a quality work product is 
lost.224 
 Outsourcing could have an effect on the legal industry similar to the flat fee, but with a 
twist. Whereas the choice of billing methods may decrease the quality of the work produced, 
outsourcing may also decrease the quality of attorney produced. Outsourcing necessarily means 
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that legal work becomes functionalized; segmented into discreet actions to be performed by 
various people in various places, some of whom may not know or understand the larger picture. 
Where once each case was handled almost entirely by one attorney, where new associates could 
research and write memos and then follow a case through to completion, learning the remainder 
of the legal process from the supervising attorneys, with outsourcing, many of these 
opportunities for learning and professional diversification are lost. The worry is twofold. First, 
despite the competitive nature of most attorneys, without these opportunities many attorneys will 
lack the incentive to seek personal improvement. Similarly, many who might have chosen to be 
attorneys will chose other professions where the potential for rewards are more in line with the 
investment made. Second, the profession itself is likely to lose the incentive to provide 
comprehensive training for all of its members. If in the struggle between business concerns and 
the less tangible rewards of professionalism business always wins, the knowledge members 
possess will become concentrated in specialties of function rather than in areas of law and those 
capable and experienced in the connections and nuances of a broader view of the law will 
become the exception rather than the rule.225 
 The consequence of this loss of broad experience across the profession is likely the 
complete restructuring of the profession. Currently a new law school graduate expects to begin 
his/her career taking on whatever is assigned, gathering a range of experience, and building 
professional depth. Under a regime heavily shaped by outsourcing, most graduates will be hired 
into the functional area at which they are already most proficient, e.g. litigating or writing. This 
will thereby stunt their ability to expand their portfolio of professional skills, and deprive the 
legal community of their full potential. As this trend progresses, the continued 
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compartmentalization of people by their skills will transform the profession from collegial to 
classist. The true value of any attorney is the knowledge, judgment, and wisdom he or she 
possesses.226 The profession must strive to promote the value of all its members, or chance 
divesting itself of the essence of its identity.  
Conclusion 
 As the practice of outsourcing grows, the legal industry will have to seriously address 
the concerns presented in this paper. Against this practice the Model Rules are treated more as 
cautionary flags to form than as roadblocks to substantive action. Cutting costs and increasing 
efficiency are admirable goals, but as is illustrated here, can be directly in conflict with 
traditional values of the profession, such as competence, wise counsel, and confidentiality. 
Likely, law firms will persist in discounting this conflict and zealously embrace outsourcing 
under the force of continuing economic pressures, remaining ignorant of the practices’ true cost 
to the profession and its members.  
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